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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is authorized by Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which confers jurisdiction on the Utah 
Appellate Court to hear an appeal from a final judgment of a 
Circuit Court of U.C.A. Section 78-2A-3 (1953), as amended. 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of 
Salt Lake County, Murray Department, State of Utah* 
A Memorandum Decision was prepared by the Judge on September 
10, 1987 and a judgment was formally executed by the Judge on 
September 21, 1987 and served by the Clerk by mail on September 
23, 1987. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff and Defendant had dated for some time and had 
lived together. They agreed to be married in February, 1986. On 
May 30, 1986, the parties purchased a dinner ring for $1,599.00. 
The receipts that were presented at trial are attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A", and clearly indicate that the ring was purchased by 
the Defendant. The ring was appraised at $2,950.00 on or about 
the 1st day of April, the parties separated and the Plaintiff 
left the Defendant's residence. 
On April 4, 1987, the Plaintiff returned to Defendant's 
house and forcefully removed the dinner ring from Defendant's 
finger and refused to return it. The Plaintiff allegedly sold 
the ring. A Bill of Sale, appraisal and bond for this ring is 
issued by Fred Meyers in the name of Rosalie Harris. However, at 
the trial, the Plaintiff claimed that the dinner ring was an 
engagement ring. The Defendant argues it was a dinner ring that 
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belonged to Plaintiff. The rings were not matched, could not be 
worn together and the dinner ring was not an engagement ring. 
Further, if was not a gift given in contemplation of marriage and 
no facts were introduced at trial to even indicate who paid for 
the ring. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to permit the 
Defendant to present the affirmative defense that the Defendant 
was entitled to an offset due to the stolen dinner ring. 
2. Whether the trial court erred by finding that it did not 
matter which party broke the engagement, but that the law should 
encourage rather than discourage breaking of engagements, and 
thereby awarded the wedding rings to the Plaintiff. 
3. Whether the trial court erred by awarding the wedding 
rings to Plaintiff in that no consideration was required for a 
promise to marry and no consideration was require by the giving 
of the ring and accordingly no expectation that the donor may 
recover the gift if the engagement was terminated. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties to this action had an on-again off-again "love-
hate11 relationship for about two years. In February of 1986, 
while the parties were living together at the Defendant's 
residence, they informally agreed for the first time to marry. 
In May of 1986, the parties purchased a dinner ring for 
$1,599.00. The ring was not an engagement ring and was purchased 
for the Defendant as all receipts (which were presented at trial) 
which are attached hereto as Exhibit "A" clearly indicated that 
the purchaser/owner was the Defendant. At the time of purchase, 
the dinner ring was appraised at $2,950.00. 
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The parties continued to have problems and in November of 
1986 the Plaintiff terminated the relationship and moved from the 
Defendants residence. There was no attempt by the Plaintiff to 
recover the dinner ring. 
In January of 1987, the parties reconciled and at that time 
they purchased a marriage ring set for $552.00. The marriage 
ring set did not match the dinner ring and could not be worn 
together. 
In April, 1987, serious compatibility problems arose and the 
Plaintiff again left the Defendant's residence and stated he 
would not marry the Defendant. Thereafter, on or about April 4, 
1987 (after Plaintiff had vacated the premises), he returned, to 
talk. Following a fight, the Plaintiff forcefully removed the 
dinner ring from the Defendant's hand and refused to return it. 
The Plaintiff allegedly later sold the dinner ring. 
The Defendant later sold the marriage rings to ZCMI for a 
$552.00 credit. 
The Plaintiff brought an action in small claims court to 
recover the wedding rings. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
AT TRIAL 
As to the marriage rings, the Plaintiff argued that the 
wedding ring was given to the Defendant in contemplation of 
marriage and since there was no marriage, he should be entitled 
to recover the marriage rings. 
The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff should not be 
entitled to the marriage rings because the Plaintiff terminated 
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the engagement and left the Defendant, 
AS TO THE DINNER RING; 
The Plaintiff argued that the dinner ring was owned by the 
Defendant that it was not given in contemplation of marriage and 
that the Bill of Sale, Receipt and Appraisal indicate it belonged 
to the Defendant. The Defendant testified that the Plaintiff 
forcefully removed the ring after terminating the relationship. 
The Defendant further argued that even if the Plaintiff were 
entitled to recover the marriage rings, that she would be 
entitled to offset any such amounts by the value of the dinner 
ring. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DONOR WHO BREAKS ENGAGEMENT 
MAY NOT RECOVER ENGAGEMENT RING 
The law as it relates to gifts made in contemplation of 
marriage is set forth generally in Am. Jr. 2d GIFTS Section 83, 
and 46 ALR 3d 58. In summary, these articles state that 
generally the law of gifts as it applies in the case of 
engagement rings is: 
(1) If the engagement is broken by the donee, the donor may 
recover the ring. 
(2) If the engagement is broken, unjustifiedly, by the 
donor, the donor may not recover the ring. 
(3) In some jurisdictions, if the engagement is terminated 
by mutual agreement, the donor is entitled to recover the ring. 
Generally, where this is the situation, there is a statutory 
provision to that effect. (E.g., California Civil Code 1590). 
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The states which embrace the above rules do so on either of 
two bases. (1) The ring given in contemplation of marriage is 
an inducement to marry. (2) The ring is symbolic of the future 
marriage and the agreement to marry and amounts to a special 
variety of gift, raising it above the normal laws of gifts. 
There are no Utah cases dealing with the subject. The only 
statutory provision that may apply to this action is U.C.A. (25-
5-4(3), which provides that "Every agreement, promise or 
undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual 
promises to marry must be in writing or it is void." It is 
logical to surmise that no consideration is required for the 
mutual promise to marry except those mutual promises. Therefore, 
any gift given in contemplation of marriage is merely a gift and 
the only way a donor could reserve a right to recover the gift 
(i.e. ring), would be to make such a reservation in writing. 
Even the California Statutes, CC1590 clearly provides that a 
gift made in contemplation of marriage is recoverable only if the 
donee refused to marry. If the donor refuses to marry the gift 
is not recoverable, Simonian vs. Donoian (1950) 96 CA2d 259, 215 
P2d 119. The authority for this proposition is simply 
overwhelming: See also 38 Cal LRev 532; Rest. Restitution 
Section 58 Comment (c) and 2 ALR 2d 579. 
The Court in the instant action held contrary and stated 
that the "policy of the law in Utah" does not relate to who broke 
off the engagement but is to roster breaking off of engagements 
that were unwisely entered into. There is simply no authority in 
Utah that would support such a statement of the policy of Utah. 
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In fact D.C.A. {25-5-4(3) requires all promises except promises 
to marry to be in writing. 
The Court further ruled that neither party presented 
sufficient evidence as to which party was at fault and broke off 
the engagement. Since the Plaintiff had the burden of proof in 
proving he did not break the engagement, the Court was obligated 
to find that claims were established on that point and 
accordingly must rule that the Defendant broke off the 
engagement. The law then clearly prevents the Plaintiff rom 
recovering the engagement ring. 
This Court should so rule but as a minimum should remand 
with instructions to determine who broke off the engagement. 
Lastly, the Utah Courts have not accepted the symbolic or 
inducement approaches to the giving of an engagement ring. 
Therefore, since no consideration is required for mutual marriage 
promises and no consideration is required for a gift absolute, 
there is no rational expectation that the donor may recover the 
engagement ring if the engagement is terminated. 
POINT II 
OWNERSHIP OF THE DINNER RING 
IS AN ISSUE IN THIS ACTION 
The Court flat out ruled that the Plaintiff was entitled to 
possession of the dinner ring and that his ownership was not in 
issue in this action, because the Plaintiff has already taken 
possession of the dinner ring. Such is an improper ruling. 
Although the "symbolic meaning" of an engagement ring may 
exist, that same meaning does not exist for other gifts. 
Interestingly, the case of Albanese vs. Indelicato cited by the 
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Small Claims Judge may hold against his own opinion and ruling 
thereon. In that case, the court awarded the engagement ring 
back to the donor, but held that a dinner ring and money given to 
the donee were not recoverable. The court stated: 
The giving of the dinner ring is an 
entirely different proposition. True, 
it was given after the parties became 
engaged. No doubt plaintiff would not 
have given the ring to defendant if 
they had not been engaged. The dinner 
ring though has no symbolic meaning 
and is only a token of the love and 
affection which plaintiff bore for the 
defendant. Many gifts are made for 
reasons that sour with the passage of 
time. Under the law though, there is no 
consideration required for a gift and it 
is absolute once made unless a condition 
imposed. 
Conversely, if a condition were imposed, it would appear that the 
statute of frauds would apply. 
POINT III 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE 
AWARDED AN OFFSET 
In the instant action, the Defendant has characterized the 
first ring given her as a dinner ring while the Plaintiff states 
it was an engagement ring. The rings were not matched, and could 
not be worn together. Further, if was never meant to be an 
engagement ring, it was a dinner ring. (The Court, however, made 
no ruling on this fact). 
The Defendant offered to prove an affirmative defense at the 
time of trial, namely that if the Plaintiff prevailed as to the 
wedding rings, that the Defendant should at least be entitled to 
an offset in an amount equal to the dinner ring. The testimony 
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at trial indicates that the dinner ring was purchased in May of 
1986. The parties, however, had agreed in February of 1986 to 
marry but no wedding rings (engagement) were purchased until 
January of 1987, when the engagement was formalized. 
The Court found the Plaintiff had possession of the dinner 
ring and that ring was not relevant to this action. Such is 
improper, for reasons previously stated. The Court refused to 
permit the Defendant to defend on the grounds of offset. Such 
was improper. 
The Defendant could clearly have field a Counterclaim to 
offset the Plaintiff's claim, but chose to defend affirmatively. 
The Defendant draws the Court's attention to Rogue River vs. Shaw 
(1966) 411 P2d 440 243 Or. 54, where the Court stated" 
". . .a set-off is a money demand 
by Defendant against Plaintiff, 
arising upon contract and constituting 
a debt independent of and unconnected 
with the Cause of Action set forth in 
the Complaint, and may be used to off-
set Plaintiff's claim but not to re-
cover affirmatively." 
See also Black Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, pg. 1538 Set-Off. 
The Court improperly refused to permit the Defendant from 
proving a set-off as to the dinner ring. This action should be 
at least remanded with instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing it is clear that the trial court committed 
several errors, namely it failed to: consider any evidence 
submitted by the defendant regarding the affirmative defense and 
offset relating to ownership of the dinner ring; properly 
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consider and apply the laws of the State of Utah in that it 
applied a public policy to encourage the breaking of engagements 
without the prospect of recovering the engagement ring regardless 
of fault; and, failed to find that either the Plaintiff(donor) or 
the Defendant(donee) was the party who refused to complete the 
marriage. This court should reverse the lower courts ruling or 
remand it back to the trial court with appropiate instructions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
fj*l 
DENNIS L. MANGRUM 
Attorney for Defendant 
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